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Pfluger v. U.S. Group Long-Term
Disability Ins. Plan, 2007 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 3161 (E.D.Wisc.
1/16/2007)(Issue: Chronic Fatigue Syndrome, Surveillance,
Functional Capacity Evaluations).
In denying the insurer’s motion for summary judgment, the
court asked a number of important questions and made numerous
valuable observations in evaluating de novo the
insurer’s termination of the plaintiff’s disability benefit
payments. The plaintiff, who had worked as a tax manager for
Arthur Andersen & Co., developed chronic fatigue syndrome and
had to cease working in 1996. Aetna underwrote the disability
coverage and approved Pfluger’s claim. Aetna also hired a
representative to assist the plaintiff in making what was
eventually a successful application for social security
disability benefits.
Although Aetna benefited from the
Social Security approval by receiving reimbursement of
overpaid benefits and a reduction of its payment obligation,
it placed Pfluger under surveillance and ultimately required
her to attend a functional capacity evaluation and an
examination by a physician hired by Aetna. Although none of
the evaluations were conclusive, Aetna cut off Pluger’s
benefits in 2001. A pre-suit appeal was unsuccessful, and
Pfluger filed suit in 2003. Aetna moved for summary judgment,
but the court found genuine issues of material fact precluded
the entry of summary judgment.
With respect to surveillance, the
court concluded:
Pfluger's ability to bend at the
waist or to pull an empty garbage can the length of her
driveway are not inconsistent with Pfluger's original physical
limitations of needing to take frequent and prolonged breaks
during the day due to prolonged fatigue after minimal effort,
difficulty sleeping, muscle aches and pains, fever, sore
throat, and generalized muscle weakness as well as her
incapacity due to migraine headaches. See Carradine v.
Barnhart, 360 F.3d 751, 755-56 (7th Cir. 2004)(noting "the
difference between a person's being able to engage in sporadic
physical activities and her being able to work eight hours a
day five consecutive days of the week"). Pfluger's main
physical limitations were her fatigue and corresponding need
to take breaks, limitations that interfered with an occupation
that requires high mental alertness, high stress/pressure, and
irregular work hours. Pfluger's occupation is admittedly not
physically demanding and her ability to bend at the waist or
to pull an empty garbage can for a moment was never the issue.
Pfluger did not claim disability based upon a complete
inability to push, pull, or lift; rather, she claimed
disability based upon the frequency and length of the fatigue
that she experienced as well as corresponding cognitive and
physical impairments. In this case, the surveillance reports
recorded a snapshot of unremarkable physical activity; they
did not capture information that belies Pfluger's reported
fatigue or impairments. See Carradine, 360 F.3d at
755-56 ("Carradine does not claim to be in wracking pain every
minute of the day. When she feels better for a little while,
she can drive, shop, do housework. It does not follow that she
can maintain concentration and effort over the full course of
the work week."). *44-*45.
Nor was the court convinced that
Pfluger’s ability to become pregnant and have a child
inconsistent with her disability. As to the other evidence,
the court found Aetna’s medical reports were “fraught with
qualifications, inconsistencies and even information favorable
to Pfluger.” *46. The FCE was also unreliable, since, as the
court noted:
What is puzzling about the FCE are
the references to "objective information." In another portion
of the FCE, Crist writes that "no objective pain behaviors
were observed," but Crist does not define "objective pain
behaviors." If "objective pain behaviors" include "grimacing"
and "groaning" as Dickison assumes, the behaviors are neither
objective nor a foolproof indicator of pain: one can grimace
and groan while experiencing no pain and one can experience
pain without grimacing and groaning. Should the court
disbelieve Pfluger's reports of pain because she did not wail
during the FCE? Crist's comment that "no objective pain
behaviors were observed" has limited value because it is
vague, and it is inconsistent with Crist's notation that
Pfluger's reports of fatigue and pain fully correlate with
"objective information." Despite this, Brown, Porter,
Hollworth, Dickison, and Aetna's briefs filed in this court
seize upon one of Crist's references to "objective evidence,"
affording it great significance without explaining its
meaning, while ignoring entirely the other reference to
"objective" evidence in the FCE that is favorable to Pfluger.
*49-*50
Thus, the court denied summary
judgment and ordered a trial to be held.
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