The plaintiff in this case initially became disabled in 1985 as the result of a work accident when a hydraulic door fell on him and fractured his C3 vertebra. Rehabilitation efforts were unsuccessful; and Sloan began receiving long-term disability benefits in the late 1980s. After 24 months, the definition of disability changed from one in […]
In a recent case, despite the application of an arbitrary and capricious standard of review, the 6th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that when MetLife terminated Wanda Glenn’s benefits, its actions were not ”the result of a deliberative process or that it was based on substantial evidence.” Glenn v. MetLife, 2006 U.S.App.LEXIS 22432 (Sept […]
A decision from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reveals how a court misunderstood key definitions in a disability case.
Today’s column discusses Burroughs v. Bellsouth Telecommunications Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52815. (June 14). Burroughs is a tour de force expose of how the ERISA law has been interpreted by the courts in a manner that thoroughly betrays Congress’ intent to protect promised benefits. U.S. District Judge William Acker Jr., a frequent critic of […]
A decision by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York reveals a court’s flawed analysis of disability.
In 1989, the Supreme Court issued Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989), which permitted the inclusion of language in employee benefit plans (including insurance policies) that would trigger a deferential standard of court review in ERISA cases.